by Joshua Shaw

Are oracles just nonsense or are they a real power for evil? Under either view Eusebius of Caesarea is convinced that pagan oracles are to be rejected, but the question is “on what grounds?” At first glance he seems to waver in his judgement; moreover, the prominent role that citations play in the exposition of his own views leads perforce to a certain measure of ambiguity. Though we will here concern ourselves particularly with his views on ancient oracles, this study proves yet again the strangeness of his methods in general (for an introduction to and apology for Eusebius’s dubious use of sources, see here and here).

Under one view, which Eusebis introduces thus, “someone else by way of preface might say…”, the oracles ought not be attributed to a god, nor in fact to an evil demon, but to clever men who phrase oracles in such a way that they can account for both outcomes. Furthermore, the alleged marvels attendant on oracular utterances are intelligible as merely natural phenomena (PE. IV.1, 8 : 131b-c). The “darkness” in which these practices are carried out aid the priests in their tricks and the “presuppositions” of the adherents, who by long usage are bound to faith in this superstition, support the burden of proof. To these reasons must be added “the silliness of mind of the multitude, and their feeble and uncritical reasoning” (ibid. sect. 10). Some – the more educated among them – are drawn into this superstition by “the poetry of the oracles themselves” (11).  He strengthens his position in Chapter 2, saying “Certainly all their oracles which have been free from ambiguity have been uttered not according to foreknowledge of the future but by mere conjecture” (IV.2, 1 : 133a). Yet due to the wide diffusion of the oracles, some are bound to be correct (sect. 2).  After listing many such smaller reasons to distrust and discredit the ancient culture of divination, he leaves behind these evidences of the negative claim that divination is false for the positive one that divination causes evil. Specifically, he charges these famous oracular sites with sedition and conspiracy (in itself no new accusation):

…though it were much better for him [whoever visits an oracle] to cease from his folly by calculating to how many others the aforesaid soothsayers have been the cause of death, and of sedition, and wars, and to consider the histories of the ancients, and observe that they never pointed out any effect of divine power even at that time when the oracles of Greece were flourishing, and those which formerly were celebrated, but now exist no longer, were firmly established…by proving how they even goaded on those who consulted them into war with each other…and how they used to mislead their inquirers…and tried to conceal their own ignorance by the darkness of uncertainty….not very long afterwards it was discovered what sort of persons they were, being proved to be human impostors and no gods, when some unfortunate catastrophe seized upon their deluded victims.

(PE IV 2, 3-4; emphasis mine)

(It is not my goal here to explain or situate the historical phenomena: it suffices to say that this event took place as Maximinus was defeated by Licinius in April of 313 A.D. As Richard Laqueur (115), remarked long ago – and Eduard Schwartz before him—there is a contradiction in the text. Did Eusebius believe that the conspiracy of the priesthood was the true explanation of the psephismata – decrees – calling for Christian persecution in Antioch (and elsewhere)? Or were these solicited by the pagan emperor (Maximinus), since Eusebius gives both explanations? Laqueur settles for the former answer after some invasive editorial work – though one should note that this mode of dissecting Eusebius’s Church History has since been rejected for various reasons. Compare a similar event some 40 years before – a subject raising debate about the relationship between Christians and Antiquity – are Christians to blame?)

Most interesting in my opinion is Eusebius’s lack of confidence in presenting his material. As mentioned before, he begins this proposal with “someone might say” and carries this conceit till the very end. He does not return to so bold a naturalistic explanation of divination until the end of his argument in Book V where he provides us with the only surviving fragments of the Cynic Oenomaus, whose railings against the nonsense of oracular utterances Eusebius belittles as “not entirely free of Cynic bitterness” (PE V.21, 6 : 213c). Though he seems to incline to a natural explanation of divination, his hesitation suggests an audience not altogether ready to accept a naturalistic explanation of ancient oracles.

Between this first feint and his final blow, Eusebius spends 100 pages arguing along traditional lines, i.e., oracles were demonically inspired (and so theoretically capable of true wonders and prescience). We will perhaps have a chance to look at the intervening arguments in future posts, but first the dilemma:

Which is true? Evil nonsense or Nonsensical evil?

Having your Cake and Eating it

By all accounts this is classic Eusebius: a presentation of mutually contradictory claims, both of which appear affirmed by the author. This is the same dilemma faced nearly 500 years ago by an enormous influencer in the history of Western thinking on divination: Anton van Dale, a Mennonite theologian of the seventeenth century. He tried to reverse the standard historical assessment of the early church on divination by his use of Eusebius’s Praeparatio Evangelica Books 4-6, overreading – in my opinion – Eusebius’s claim that “countless others” have shown such “prediction” to be “quackery” (see here for van Dale p. 54; here for a somewhat poor English rendering of an originally French popular adaptation. To my knowledge there is no complete rendering into English of the full Latin original).

More interesting than van Dale’s larger claim is his assessment of the difficulty which we have just presented:

Eusebius, in the Beginning of his fourth Book of Evangelical Preparations, proposes at large the best Reasons in the World to prove, that Oracles could be no other, than Impostures: And it is upon those very Reasons, that I pretend to support myself, when I come to treat of the cheats of Oracles in particular.

…But it is to be noted, that after Eusebius had very well proved, that Oracles could be no other than the Impostures of Priests, he assures us (without either destroying or weakening those first Proofs) that for all this, they were delivered by Daemons. But he ought to have cited some unsuspected Oracle, which had been delivered in such Circumstances, that although many others might be imputed to the Artifices of Priests, yet that could not [be]. But Eusebius has done no such thing. This is, as if he should say, I clearly see, that all the Oracles can be no other than Cheats; but yet, I will not believe them to be so, because it serves my purpose, that the Devil should now and then enter into an Oracle.

This is a very lamentable kind of reasoning (!). But I must confess, if Eusebius (in the Circumstances of the times which he lived in) durst not have said openly, that Oracles were not the Works of Daemons, it had been excusable; but then in seeming to maintain that they were so, he ought to have managed his Arguments in such a way, that he might have insinuated the contrary with the best Address he was capable of. But we are at liberty to guess at the Reasons, that guided Eusebius in this matter, according to the Esteem we have of him: For my own part, I believe clearly, that he asserted these Oracular Daemons, rather by way of Apology and from a forced Respect he had for the common Opinion, than on any other Account.

(ibid. p. 79-81)

We can note a few things here in summary: 1) van Dale (important for subsequent thinking about oracles) thinks that it is “upon [Eusebius’s] Reasons, that [he] claim[s] to support [him]self”; 2) these reasons were “very well proved”; 3) yet he finds Eusebius duplicitous at this point, so that we can do nothing but “guess at the Reasons, that guided Eusebius in this matter, according to the Esteem we have of him”; 4) his solution is that Eusebius here is covering himself over against “common Opinion.”

This is, I think, exactly correct in all but one particular: Eusebius has made a nested set of concessions to certain kinds of readers not because he is afraid of “common Opinion” but because he wants to influence “common Opinion” on pagan divination. I say “nested,” because the entire treatment begins with “someone else might say”: had van Dale noticed this caveat, Eusebius’s apparent duplicity would have been overcome, though the question what Eusebius himself believed remains an open one. We will explore this in future posts.